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Introduction
This Development Viewpoint assesses Brazil’s macroeco-
nomic performance during the ‘leftist’ governments of Lula da 
Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014).
During this whole period (2003-2014), GDP grew by an aver-
age of about 3.4% per year while the average inflation rate was 
5.9% (see Table 1, next page). In addition, the unemployment 
rate dropped from 12.3% to 4.8%. The fiscal surplus averaged 
3.1% of GDP and the net public debt dropped from 52% of GDP 
to 37%. 
Foreign reserves increased from US$49 billion to US$364 billion 
while the yearly trade balance averaged US$25.5 billion. How-
ever, the current account as a ratio to GBP began running a defi-
cit in 2008, in the wake of the international financial crisis, and 
this deficit worsened to -4.2% by 2014. While the policy interest 
had declined from its peak in 2003, it was still almost 11% in 
2014.
But, overall, Brazil has displayed a healthy combination of mac-
roeconomic resilience, income redistribution and poverty re-
duction. For example, between 2000 and 2012 the Gini Index 
fell from 0.589 to 0.526 and by the end of 2012 about 13.6 mil-
lion families were benefitting from Bolsa Família, the govern-
ment’s main program against poverty. 
Assessing Policies over Time
The whole period of the ‘leftist’ governments of Lula da Sila and 
Dilma Rousseff can be divided into two parts. Lula da Silva’s first 
term (2003-2006) was notable for continuing the macroeco-
nomic policies of the outgoing government of Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso. This stance was based on the New Consensus 
Macroeconomics, which was based on maintaining inflation 
targeting, a fiscal surplus and a flexible exchange rate. 
In Lula da Silva’s second term (2007-2010) and Dilma Rousseff’s 
first (2011-2014), they had to introduce structural measures and 
economic policies that were designed primarily to respond to 
the global financial crisis and the resulting ‘Great Recession’. 
Lula da Silva’s First Term (2003-2006)
In his inaugural speech in January 2003, President Lula da Silva 
announced his intention to tackle social problems and rekin-
dle self-sustaining economic growth. But by the end of his first 
term, the economic results were relatively poor: average GDP 
growth was only 3.5%, the inflation rate stood at 6.4% and the 
unemployment rate was still 10.9%. 
During this period, net exports were the main source of growth 
for the Brazilian economy. By 2006 the trade balance had risen 
to over US$46 billion and the current account as a ratio to GDP 
had improved to a 1.3% surplus.
 
But Brazil’s success depended on improvements in the global 
economy, especially in China and the USA. Global growth 
sparked increases in the prices of commodities on international 
markets. As a result, during 2003-2006, Brazil’s foreign reserves 
expanded from US$49 billion to US$86 billion.
But Lula’s administration was hampered by the New Consensus 
Macroeconomics still being implemented by the Brazilian Cen-
tral Bank. It operated a tight monetary policy, maintaining, for 
example, the average nominal interest rate at over 18% and the 
real interest rate at about 12%. The Central Bank also pursued fi-
nancial liberalization, which facilitated the outward and inward 
flow of short-term capital.
 
Critically, the Central Bank also insisted on promoting an aver-
age primary fiscal surplus of about 4.5% of GDP. This level was 
even higher than the 4.25% target proposed by the Internation-
al Monetary Fund.
Lula da Silva’s Second Term (2007-2010)
In 2007, at the start of Lula da Silva’s second term, fiscal policy 
shifted course slightly, broadening the coverage of the govern-
ment’s social protection programs and expanding public in-
vestment. Noteworthy was its new Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento (PAC), which sought to boost public investment in 
infrastructure and stimulate private investment.
 
During previous financial crises, Brazil’s governments had tight-
ened fiscal and monetary policies, usually within the framework 
of an IMF stabilization program. But in response to the global 
financial crisis that erupted in 2008, Lula da Silva sought to im-
plement more expansionary, counter-cyclical policies.
Begrudgingly, the Central Bank did finally decide in 2009 to re-
duce the policy interest rate from 13.75% in January to 8.75% 
in September. And Brazil’s state-owned banks – Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), Banco do Bra-
sil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) – were instructed by 
the government to expand credit to the economy, in order to 
counteract the contraction of credit from private banks (both 
national and foreign).
The government’s fiscal policy combined tax reductions and 
increased spending. As a result, its stimulus package injected a 
total of US$20.4 billion into the economy (equivalent to 1.2 % 
of Brazil’s GDP in 2009). In addition, in order to boost aggregate 
demand, the government launched the Minha Casa, Minha Vida 
program of government incentives and subsidies for housing 
construction, and it also expanded its social programs.
After experiencing a recession in 2009 (with GDP contracting 
by -0.2%), the Brazilian economy increased strongly by 7.6% in 
2010 as a result of these countercyclical economic policies.
 
During the entirety of Lula de Silva’s second term (2007-2010), 
GDP grew by an average 4.5% per year (aided by increases in 
investment, private consumption and exports); the average an-
nual inflation stood at 5.1%; and the unemployment dropped 
from 9.3% to 6.7%.  
However, Brazil’s external trade deteriorated significantly from 
2007 to 2010. The yearly trade surplus dropped from US$40 bil-
lion to about US$20 billion and the current account as ratio to 
GDP declined from about 0% to -2.2%.  
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Rousseff’s First Term (2011-2014) 
In 2011, immediately after Dilma Rouseff’s presidential inau-
guration, Brazil’s Central Bank boosted the policy interest rate 
in order to dampen inflationary pressures associated with the 
healthy economic growth of 7.6% in 2010. Fiscal policy also be-
came tighter. 
Thus, by the end of the year the policy interest rate had risen 
to 11.75% and the primary fiscal surplus had reached 3.1% of 
GDP. But the Brazilian economy still managed to grow by 3.9% 
in 2011.
 
After the middle of 2011 there was a gradual worsening in the 
international context for Brazil’s economy due to the Euro cri-
sis. In response, Brazil’s Central Bank tightened up its regulation 
and supervision of Brazil’s financial sector.  And it lowered its 
policy interest rate to 7.25% by the end of the year.
 
Also, the government implemented a fiscal stimulus package 
that included increased government spending and subsidies 
and cuts in taxation. It also planned to boost investment to 
close to US$500 billion for the period 2011-2014. In addition, it 
initiated a new industrial policy, the Plano Brasil Maior.
But these counter-cyclical measures failed to sustain economic 
activity and, as a result, the Brazilian economy grew by only 
1.8% in 2012. The inflation rate also began to increase by the 
end of 2012. 
In response, the Central Bank began to implement tighter 
monetary policies. Hence, by the end of 2014, the policy inter-
est rate had risen back up to almost 11%. But Brazil’s exchange 
rate became very volatile during this period, reflecting both the 
uncertainties over US monetary policy and the deterioration of 
its own external accounts. By 2014, Brazil’s current account bal-
ance as a ratio to GDP had deteriorated to -4.2%.
In order to counteract tighter monetary policies, Rousseff’s ad-
ministration continued to expand public expenditures. But, as a 
consequence, the government’s primary fiscal balance dropped 
from +2.4% of GDP in 2012 to -0.6% in 2014.
As a result, during Dilma Rousseff’s first administration (2011-
2014), the average yearly GDP growth rate declined to only 
2.1%. And in 2014 it was only 0.1%. The average inflation rate 
over the four years had risen back up to 6.2%. And the aver-
age current account deficit as a ratio to GDP had risen to about 
-3.1%. 
How to Revive the Brazilian Economy
In summing up Brazil’s macroeconomic policy trends since 
2007, it is reasonable to argue that despite generally progres-
sive efforts to pursue developmentalist policies, the ‘leftist’ 
governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff have been 
hampered by the more conservative inflation targeting regime 
maintained by Brazil’s Central Bank. However, such convention-
al inflation targeting does not ensure macroeconomic stability, 
at least not from a demand-side Keynesian perspective.
 
From a Keynesian perspective on maintaining stability, macro-
economic policies should be coordinated in such a way as to 
(i) operationalize fiscal policies that can expand effective de-
mand as well as reduce social inequalities, (ii) institute more 
flexible monetary policies so as to maintain adequate levels of 
consumption and investment, and (iii) coordinate and regulate 
financial and foreign-exchange markets in order to stabilize 
capital flows and exchange rates.
 
Such a fundamental policy stance would imply that the Brazil-
ian government should maintain its Keynesian countercyclical 
macroeconomic stance and developmentalist strategy, not just 
in response to international financial crises—but, more impor-




2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Inflation Rate 
(IPCA), %
9.30 7.60 5.69 3.14 4.46 5.9 4.31 5.91 6.50 5.84 5.91 6.41
GDP growth (%)
1.2 5.7 3.1 4.0 6.1 5.0 - 0.2 7.6 3.9 1.8 2.7 0.1
Interest rate 
(Selic), average 
(%) 23.0 16.4 19.2 15.2 12.0 12.7 10.1 9.9 11.75 8.63 8.29 10.96
Trade balance 
(US$ billion)
24.8 33.6 44.7 46.1 40.0 24.7 24.6 20.3 29.8 19.4 2.6 - 3.9
Current account/
GDP
0.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 0.1 -1.7 -1.5 -2.2 -2.1 -2.4 -3.6 -4.2
Fiscal surplus/
GDP (%)
4.3 4.6 4.8 4.3 4.0 4.1 2.1 2.8 3.1 2.4 1.5 - 0.6
Table 1: Brazilian Macroeconomic Indicators, 2003-2014
Source: Brazilian Central Bank, Séries Temporais, http://www.bcb.gov.br (2015).
